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Abstract 
This  article  examines  the  driving  forces  of  the  magnitude,  composition  and 
duration of refugee movements caused by conflict and persecution. The decision to 
seek temporary or permanent refuge in the region of origin or in a more distant 
asylum destination is based on inter-temporal optimization. We find that asylum 
seeking  in  Western  countries  is  rather  a  phenomenon  of  comparatively  less 
persecuted  people.  In  an  attempt  to  reduce  their  respective  asylum  burdens, 
Western countries and host countries in the region of origin are likely to end up in a 
race to the bottom of restrictive asylum policies. As an alternative, this study shows 
that  proactive  refugee-related  aid  transfers  are,  under  certain  circumstances,  an 
effective instrument to relieve Western countries from asylum pressure.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Refugee  situations  are  one  of  the  most  neglected  or  even  forgotten  human 
sufferings. An involuntarily displaced mass of people often lives for a significant 
period of time under appalling conditions in a state of limbo, mostly in a country 
that is not their own. Their dilemma is mostly threefold: going back to their home 
country is dangerous, primarily because of ongoing insecurity and persecution; in 
addition, they are often not allowed to settle freely and to be economically self-
reliant in the first asylum country, and finally, they are practically unable to seek 
asylum  in  a  Western  country,  either  because  of  a  lack  of  resources  or  the  low 
prospects of receiving asylum status and permanent residence rights. As a result, in 
2005, there were more than 9.2 million refugees, of which 5.5 million individuals 
were  caught  in  a  protracted  or  long-lasting  situation  (UNHCR,  2006b).  The 
numbers, as well as the duration, of these situations have vastly increased during 
the past decade. In 1993, 27 protracted refugee situations existed and it is estimated 
that the average duration of major refugee situations will have increased from nine 
years in 1993 to an average duration of 17 years by the end of 2003 (UNHCR, 2006b; 
UNHCR, 2004).  
It  is  generally  acknowledged  that  the  major  causes  of  long-lasting  refugee 
situations  are  political  in  nature.  Unambiguously,  the  United  Nations  High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) states that  
"[...] Protracted refugee situations stem from political impasses. They are 
not inevitable, but are rather the result of political action and inaction, both in 
the country of origin (the persecution or violence that led to flight) and in the 
country of asylum. They endure because of ongoing problems in the countries 
of  origin,  and  stagnate  and  become  protracted  as  a  result  of  responses  to 
refugee  inflows,  typically  involving  restrictions  on  refugee  movement  and 
employment possibilities, and confinement to camps." (UNHCR, 2004) 
This  article  provides  the  theoretical  background  for  an  analysis  of  refugee 
migration  and  the  role  of  alternative  asylum  policies  in  explaining  this 
phenomenon. A review of the economic migration literature reveals a severe lack of 3 
 
research dealing with refugee movements. Most of the early migration literature is 
based upon static rural-urban or international wage differentials (Sjaastadt, 1962; 
Todaro, 1969; Harris & Todaro, 1970). According to this, regional or international 
wage differentials are the driving incentives for voluntary and permanent migration. 
This does not reflect the reality of refugee movements. By definition, refugees do 
not flee for purely economic reasons, at least initially; and, refugee migration is not 
necessarily  a  one-way  movement,  and  thus,  not  a  permanent  phenomenon.  For 
realizing the latter, temporary migration models introduce a special loyalty held by 
individuals for their home country. Voluntarily return migration then is induced by 
the  migrant’s  special  preferences  for  consumption  at  home  being  higher  than 
abroad (Djajic & Milbourne, 1988; Dustmann, 2003; Brücker & Schröder, 2006).  
However, this special loyalty for the home country is ‘reduced’ for individuals 
that are victims of conflict and persecution. Refugees, unlike economic migrants, 
leave their home country even if the economic situation abroad is inferior. But, even 
if consumption at home might be foiled by insecurity and danger, there is some 
empirical evidence that refugees living in encampments under very poor conditions 
just  across  the  border  often  return  home  despite  ongoing  repressions  and 
substantial risks of being affected by civil strife (Rogge, 1994). These effects are also 
not captured by existing migration models.  
Furthermore, refugees also have the option to seek asylum in a Western country 
that promises better economic perspectives, although the incentive to move on to a 
Western country is cushioned by the uncertainty about the asylum application’s 
outcome. Thus, asylum policies of Western countries, as well as that of the conflict-
neighboring first asylum countries, need to be taken into account when analyzing 
the migration decision of persecuted individuals.  
Consequently, a satisfactory model for understanding the mechanisms of refugee 
movements  and  their  protraction  must  contain  features  of  (i)  temporary  and 
permanent migration, (ii) economic and non-economic push and pull factors, (iii) 
uncertainty about the success of an asylum seeking process, and (iv) a non-static 
framework for analyzing inter-temporal migration patterns. Therefore, a dynamic 4 
 
model is required to approach alternative migration options in a long-term time 
horizon. 
The innovation of this study is to model the simultaneous decision on seeking 
asylum in a Western country, moving temporarily or permanently across the border 
to  a  neighboring  first  asylum  country,  or  staying  at  home.  This  framework  will 
enable  the  analysis  of  the  alternative  policies  available  to  both  neighboring  first 
asylum  and  Western  destination  countries  that  we  indentify  as  decisive  in 
explaining the pattern and duration of international refugee migration movements. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section outlines 
the migration model and derives some core propositions. Then, we discuss various 
implications  of  reactive  and  proactive  counter-asylum  policies  for  the  refugee 
migration pattern. Section 4 concludes the article. 
2. MODEL ANALYSIS 
This basic analytical framework models the intertemporal migration decision of 
N heterogeneous individuals living in a country of origin O before a conflict breaks 
out. Heterogeneity of individuals refers to the extent each individual is affected by 
this conflict, i.e. individual persecution level p in the home country O is uniformly 
distributed with density N between      . According to the respective persecution 
level, the individuals decide upon several migration options to realize for the rest of 
their lifetime   , which is normalized to unity.
1 The three migration options are: 
first,  staying  in  the  conflict  affected  country  of  origin  O  despite  threat  and 
persecution,  second,  emigrating  (with  negligible  migration  costs)  for  the  period 
               ,  i.e.  temporarily  or  permanently,  to  a  neighboring  first  asylum 
country     where  security  is  guaranteed  but  where  confinement  to  a  camp  or 
limitations  in  self-reliance  impose  worse  economic  conditions,  or  third,  the 
opportunity  to  migrate  (with  migration  costs       to  a  Western  industrialized 
                                                      
1 This assumption does not change the qualitative results of the subsequent model.   5 
 
country   with better economic prospects (and security) to seek asylum, but with 
the risk of being rejected and deported to the home country  .
2   
Conditions are such that each individual could receive an income level of    at 
home,    in the first asylum country, and    in Western industrialized country, 
assuming that    is by far larger than the income levels of the other two developing 
countries,    and    .
3 However, income generation is hindered by the first asylum 
country,  i.e.  the  level  of  economic  self-reliance     is  a  policy  parameter  with 
         , indicating the proportion of the standard income level    that is actually 
available for refugees. The disposable income in the first asylum country is then 
given by     .
4  
The utility       an individual derives from time-invariant consumption either in 
the country of origin (  
O , the (neighboring) first asylum country (  
S , or in the 
Western country (  
W , respectively, are given by: 
       
O      
     
O 
     (1) 
        
S      
S 
    (2) 
        
W      
W 
    (3) 
                                                      
2 For simplicity reasons, asylum recognition rates are not specific to individuals but to the 
whole population of asylum seekers.   
3 We further assume that before the conflict broke out at time          , only economic 
migrants that could afford the high migration costs    left the country of origin towards 
the Western country. For the remaining N individuals staying permanently at home is the 
superior solution in times of peace. 
4 For instance, economic self-reliance might be restricted by confinement to a refugee camp 
or a closed settlement, constrained work permission, limited land ownership, etc., all of 
which lessens human capital productivity and the potential to generate income in the first 
asylum country. 6 
 
Generally, the migration decision and its realization takes place at        for all N 
individuals.
5  
The Cross-Border Option 
For the first migration option, moving to the (neighboring) first asylum country 
S, the individual must choose the duration for the stay,   , and the consumption 
levels  abroad  and  at  home  (if  migration  is  temporary).  Thus,  each  individual 
maximizes its lifetime utility   
  with respect to duration and consumption, i.e. 
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subject to the individual’s budget constraint: 
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The Lagrangian    , i.e. the shadow value of income, is also time-invariant. Eqs. (6) 
and (7( imply that  
                                                      
5 At this point of time, the both asylum countries have already decided on their respective 
asylum policies. 7 
 
      
      
    (10) 
This  condition  indicates  that  consumption  at  home  is  a  linear  function  of 
consumption abroad, i.e. the marginal utility of consumption at home and abroad 
must be equal. This condition (10) generates together with eqs. (8) and (6) explicit 
consumption levels for at home and abroad: 
    
S  
           





   (11) 
For  temporary  migrants,  consumption  at  home  and  abroad  is  related  to  the 
bilateral  income  differential  between  the  country  of  origin  and  the  first  asylum 
country; consumption abroad exceeds their disposable income abroad (i.e. negative 
savings). Thus, in order to not exceed the intertemporal budget, the refugee returns 
home. Substituting eqs. (10) and (11) into eq. (9), the optimal duration of the stay 
abroad is determined by the other model parameters: 
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Figure 1 displays the duration function        of the cross-the border option. The 
higher the persecution level (i.e. the lower   ), the longer the refugee stays abroad. 
For individuals with a persecution level       , the optimal value of    is larger unity 
(i.e. the total lifetime), which means that the individual migrates permanently into 
the first asylum country; for less persecuted individuals with       , the migration 
duration    is smaller zero, i.e. the respective individuals stay at home for their life 
time. All individuals with medium persecution levels   
     stay only temporarily in 
the first asylum country: 
 
         
                   
          
         




The following constraints describe the cross-the-border migration option:  
(i)  There are individuals that do not leave the home country, or only leave 
temporarily, if there exists a negative income differential, i.e.            if  
            .  
(ii)  There are individuals that leave the home country permanently, if the self-
reliance level in the first asylum country is not too strict, i.e.       , if  
   
   
   .  
(iii)  There  is  a  total  permanent  outflow  of  all  individuals,  if  the  economic 
situation abroad is definitely superior to the situation at home, i.e.       
 , if     
  
  . 
We assume that Proposition 1 (i and ii) hold for all of the subsequent analysis. 
 




Finally, the optimized utility function with respect to the individual persecution 
level    is then given by substituting eqs. (12), (11), and (10) into (4), taking into 
account the constraints of (13): 
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The Asylum-Seeking Option  
As an alternative to the cross-border option, the refugee may move to a third 
country to seek asylum. A generally preferred destination for that movement is a 
Western country   that promises better economic prospects. However, low asylum 
recognition rates that signal low chances of being accepted may discourage asylum 
migration.
6  Uncertainty  about  the  asylum  admission  process  exposes  potential 
asylum seekers to the risk of being deported to the country of origin.
7 In this model, 
an asylum seeker is accepted with probability  , which is the asylum recognition 
                                                      
6 This implication has been verified in several empirical studies providing evidence for the 
negative impact of low recognition rates on asylum applications in EU member states (Vink 
& Meijerink, 2003; Neumayer, 2004; Neumayer, 2005). 
7 In this model, we consider only the case in which rejected asylum seekers are deported to 
their country of origin, acknowledging that this is often not accomplished by asylum states 
because  of  the  non-refoulement  proviso  of  the  1951/67  UN  Refugee  Convention. 
Alternatively, rejected asylum seekers are often sent back to a safe third country. 10 
 
rate, or with probability         he/she is rejected and deported back to the home 
country where the individual stays for the rest of their lifetime       .
8 To realize 
this migration option, the asylum seeker must invest migration costs   . These 
costs must not be larger than the alternative lifetime income at home, i.e.      
  , since in the case of deportation, the intertemporal budget constraint must still 
hold.
9  The  recognition  rate  is  the  policy  parameter  that  indicates  whether  the 
Western asylum country is rather liberal (   is large) or restrictive (   is small) in its 
asylum policy.  
With respect to this asylum option, the expected utility for the individual is given 
by: 
    
        
W 
             
     
O 
  (15) 
subject to the respective consumption levels abroad and at home: 
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Substituting eqs. (16) and (17) into (15) delivers the expected utility with respect 
to the individual’s persecution level: 
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with  
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8 For simplicity reasons we assume that  the migration movement itself  and the asylum 
procedure are not time-consuming.  
9 In fact, we exclude the case that a rejected and deported asylum seeker emigrates again to 
the first asylum country. This model variation is possible, but makes it less tractable. 
10 See derivations in the Appendix. 11 
 
Figure 2 The Refugee Migration Decision: Who, Where, and How long 
 
 
Figure  2  displays  the  utility  curves  of  the  two  alternative  migration  options, 
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     .  Individuals choose the asylum seeking option if and only if 
   
          
     . Depending on the exogenous parameters, the ‘cross-the-border’ 
utility function and concave-shaped ‘asylum option’ can have a maximum of two 
cut-off values. The two possible cut-off persecution levels    and     (with       
    for the decision between the two migration options, i.e. asylum seeking in the 12 
 
first asylum country or cross-border emigration, are determined by the equality of 
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(19) 
According  to  this  condition,  all  individuals  become  asylum  seekers  in  the 
Western country, if  
                     , and                      , 
i.e.  if 
  O 
 
   O MW 
 
  W MW     O MW 
         
  S
 W MW 
 
.  
This holds, if the value of the asylum option is very high, i.e. if the migration 
costs    are very low, the income gap   W    O  is very high, and the asylum policy 
of the Western country is very liberal ( high r).  
There is only one intersection point    , if  
                     , and                      , 
i.e. if 
  O 
 
   O MW 
 
  W MW     O MW 
         
  S
 W MW 
 
.  
The singular cut-off value    , with            , is caused by low migration costs 
 W or a ‘moderate’ Western asylum policy r with individuals migrating either to the 
Western asylum country (those with             ) and those staying at home (or 
fleeing temporarily to the neighboring country S). Furthermore, there is only one 
intersection point   , if 
              
S       , and                      , 
                                                      
11 See the Appendix for some explicit calculations of    and    . 
12 If the two curves osculate, i.e. where  
      
    
      
   , it follows         , indicating no 
asylum migration to the Western country.  13 
 
i.e. if  
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 W MW 
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  W MW     O MW 
 .  
In this case, highly persecuted people (i.e.,        ) leave the home country and 
enter the neighboring country across the border, while less persecuted individuals 
choose  the  long-distance  asylum  option  in  a  Western  country.  Why?  Highly 
persecuted  and  risk-averse  individuals  that  face  the  risk           of  involuntary 
repatriation (deportation) to the home country have a stronger incentive to avoid 
this risk than less endangered fellows. Therefore, better economic prospects in the 
Western asylum country have a relatively strong impact for those individuals that 
have lower opportunity costs arising from the option of living  in persecution at 
home.  Thus,  those  who  seek  asylum  in  the  Western  country  are  rather  the  less 
persecuted  refugees  compared  to  those  fleeing  to  a  neighboring  first  asylum 
country.  
Two cut-off values (as in Figure 2) are possible, if 
                     , and                      , 
i.e. if  
  S
 W MW 
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   O MW 
 
  W MW     O MW 
 .  
In this case, the Western asylum policy is rather strict. However, if it is too strict, 
the asylum option  is inferior for all individuals and no asylum migration to  the 
Western country takes place (i.e., no intersection with               .  
Proposition 2 
(i)  There  are  individuals  that  do  not  leave  the  home  country,  if  the  income 
differential between it and the Western country is not too large or migration 
costs are rather high, i.e. if                      , i.e. if              . 
(Note: Proposition 1 (i) must still hold, i.e.,         .) 
(ii)  There is no permanent emigration to the first asylum country, but instead 
individuals  migrate  to  the  Western  asylum  country,  if  the  asylum 
recognition  rate  is  not  too  low,  i.e.    if                       ,  i.e.  if  
     
   




Since the persecution levels of the N individuals of the conflict-affected country of 
origin are assumed to be uniformly distributed between      , the number of asylum 
seekers to the Western asylum country     is then given by:
13 
    
                  (20) 
The subsequent analysis of policy implications is based on comparative statics based 
on the total differential of eqs. (19) and the effects on the number of asylum seekers 
to the Western asylum country    . 
3. COUNTER-ASYLUM POLICIES 
This section analyzes the effects of exogenous changes to some policy parameters 
on the pattern of refugee migration movements.  
3.1.  DEFENSIVE ASYLUM POLICY: ASYLUM RESTRICTION 
Decline in Self-Reliance in the Cross-the-Border Country 
If the level of self-reliance   decreases, the consumption level of the permanent 
cross-border refugees decreases, while that of the temporary refugees increases, and 
that of the individuals that stay at home remains unchanged. Correspondingly, the 
average duration spent abroad increases for the whole conflict-affected population: 
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13 Obviously, the number of admitted asylum seekers is given by                       . 15 
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This implies that if the first asylum country becomes more liberal in granting 
higher levels of self-reliance  , then ceteris paribus the number of hosted permanent 
refugees increases and the number of returnees (i.e., temporary refugees) decreases.  
Graphically,  a  liberalization  of  self-reliance  activities  for  cross-border  refugees 
shifts  the         -curve  upwards  for  persecution  levels        ,  but  remains 
unchanged for the less persecuted population        (see Figure 3). Consequently, 
this positive shift in the value of the cross-the-border option has a reducing effect 
on asylum migration: 
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resulting from eqs. (19), 
   
       and 
   
         4 Thus, it follows that the number of 
asylum seekers decreases if the first asylum country becomes more liberal in its self-
reliance policy:  
   
           
  
      (25) 
Eqs. (22), (23) and (25) imply that if the economic situation for refugees in the 
first asylum country improves by granting extended economic self-reliance, then (i) 
the number of permanent cross-border refugees does not decrease, (ii) the number 
of asylum seekers in the Western country does not increase, (iii) the total stock of 
emigrants does not decrease, and (iv) the average duration of a refugee situation in 
the first asylum country does not decrease. Thus, Western asylum countries have a 
reasonable  self-interest  in  a  more  liberal  refugee  policy  in  cross-the-border 
countries.  This  holds  particularly  when  small  geographical  distances  make  the 
                                                      
14 See derivation of the latter in the Appendix. 16 
 
migration  costs     for  migrating  to  a  Western  country  relatively  affordable  to 
asylum seekers. 
Proposition 3 
An  increasing  degree  of  self-reliance  in  the  first  asylum  country  in  terms  of  a 
liberalizing  refugee  and  integration  policy  (e.g.  including work  permissions,  use  of 
local services, etc.) increases ceteris paribus the value of the cross-the-border option 
and protracts a refugee situation.  
Figure 3 Liberalization of Self-Reliance in the First Asylum Country 
 
 
Decline in Recognition Rates in the Western Asylum Country 
With respect to the restrictions on asylum immigration in the Western country, 
asylum  admission  policy  is  an  effective  instrument  for  regulating  the  stock  of 
asylum seekers. As shown in Figure 4, the value of the asylum option decreases for 
all individuals, and consequently, the number of individuals seeking asylum in the 
Western  country  diminishes,  increasing  the  number  who  choose  to  stay  in  the 
region of origin: 17 
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by taking into account eqs. (19),  
   
      , and 
   
      . 5 The same asylum reducing 
effect holds for increasing migration costs   .
16  
Proposition 4 
A  more  liberal  asylum  policy  in  the  Western  destination  alleviates  the  refugee 
situation in the cross-the-border country, while rising migration costs for realizing the 
asylum  option  to  the  Western  asylum  country  deflects  refugee  flows  towards  the 
cross-the-border country.  
                                                      
15 See derivation of the latter expression in the Appendix. 
16  If  the  Western  asylum  country  held  no  ‘bias’  for  asylum  seekers  from  a  specific 
background, i.e. if       is equal for asylum seekers from different countries, then asylum 
recognition rates tend ceteris paribus to be lower for asylum seekers from countries close to 
the Western destination, since migration costs for them are more moderate (Proof: 
  
         
for         ). 
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Figure 4 Declining Asylum Recognition Rate in the Western Asylum Country 
 
 
As a consequence of a more restrictive asylum policy in the Western country, the 
inflow of a large refugee population aggravates the public perception within the first 
asylum country of refugees as an economic and political burden and a threat for the 
internal security of the civil society. Consequently, the first asylum country might 
intensify encampment and reduce economic self-reliance, worsening the refugees’ 
situation (Loescher & Milner, 2005). This policy response of the first asylum country 
is driven by the expectation that a more liberal encampment policy with enhanced 
opportunities for the economic self-reliance of the refugees would rather protract 
the refugee situation within its territory. Potential refugees expecting to live under 
appalling encampment conditions are then ceteris paribus more likely to repatriate 
earlier  or  to  choose  immediately  the  asylum  option  in  a  Western  country.  As  a 
consequence, the Western country is likely to respond in an analogous manner by 
restricting asylum conditions (i.e., reducing recognition rates). Finally, a race to the 
bottom is established with highly restrictive asylum policies in the Western world 
and  appalling  refugee  and  encampment  conditions  in  the  conflict-affected 
developing world.  19 
 
The challenge of international refugee politics is to solve this apparent dilemma 
of  restrictive  asylum  policies,  which  is,  in  economic  terms,  an  inefficient 
equilibrium.  Deterrence,  deflection,  detention,  and  deportation  of  refugees  are 
counterproductive  measures  for  resolving  the  appalling  conditions  for  refugees, 
including the waste of resources for long-distance asylum migration. But beyond 
this, without dealing with the root causes of the refugee movements, these measures 
are also costly to the respective asylum countries, e.g. by increasing costs for border 
control,  administration  and  maintenance  due  to  the  increasing  propensity  of 
refugees and asylum seekers to stay irregularly in the respective asylum country. An 
alternative  to  this  bilateral  asylum  restriction  policy  might  be  a  more  proactive 
approach,  particularly  on  the  side  of  Western  countries,  that  might  tackle  the 
underlying  causes  of  asylum-seeking  in  both  the  country  of  origin  and  the  first 
asylum country.  
3.2.  PROACTIVE ASYLUM POLICY: MIGRATION PREVENTIVE AID 
TRANSFERS 
The Western country may invest resources into proactive measures for tackling 
the  root  causes  in  the  conflict-ridden  country  of  origin  or  sharing  the  refugee-
burden in the first asylum country, assisting local integration that might also reduce 
the asylum migration pressure to the Western country. Although there are various 
proactive policies available, the focus in this analysis is on migration-preventive aid 
transfers  from  the  Western  asylum  country  to  the  country  of  origin  or  the  first 
asylum country. The crucial question of any proactive asylum policy in terms of 
migration-preventive aid is whether aid can indeed reduce asylum migration flows? 
Or, in terms of the present model, does an aid-induced increase of income levels in 
the country of origin or the first asylum country relieve the asylum burden in the 
Western country?  
The following analysis presumes that aid is to some extent income-effective. A 
necessary condition for this to be true is that aid, when transferred from the donor 
to the respective recipient country, is indeed channeled within the recipient country 20 
 
to the refugee population where aid can develop the income-generating effect. This 
is a necessary condition of the subsequent discussion.  
Aid to the First Asylum Country 
First asylum countries are often overstressed and unable to tackle the political and 
economic  challenges  that  large  refugee  inflows  provoke.  A  common  reaction  of 
these cross-the-border countries is to confine refugees within camps, denying them 
freedom  of  movement,  access  to  social  services,  or  economic  self-reliance.  Aid 
targeted at refugees in first asylum countries shall promote the living standards of 
the refugees. But what is the effect on the first asylum country itself? According to 
the previous model, an aid-induced increase in the refugees’ income level implies 
that ceteris paribus the total refugee stock in the first asylum country increases: 
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However, the net outcome for the first asylum country depends on the effect of 
asylum migration to the Western country:   
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with eqs. (19) and by taking into account that 
   
        and 
   
       .
17  
Income-increasing  aid  towards  the  first  asylum  country  has  an  unambiguous 
reducing effect on the number of asylum seekers in the Western country. Thus, if 
aid  is  channeled  to  the  respective  refugee  population  (and  if  it  is  effective  in 
increasing their income level), the asylum pressure to the Western country does not 
increase (see also Figure 3):  
   
           
          (29) 
                                                      
17 See derivation of the latter in the Appendix. 21 
 
While this policy is beneficial to the Western country, it leaves the first asylum 
country with a higher number of refugees. Interestingly, although this policy might 
work for the interests of Western donor countries, they are nevertheless reluctant to 
provide more resources for that purpose (UNHCR, 2006a; Czaika & Mayer, 2008). 
Why? Possibly, Western countries don’t consider aid to be as effective in generating 
additional income for the refugees or they take the negative consequences for the 
first asylum countries into account. Obviously, these first asylum countries are even 
more  reluctant  for  Western  countries  to  adopt  this  policy,  because  it  shifts  and 
consolidates  the  refugee-burden  onto  their  territory.  As  a  consequence,  the  first 
asylum country would respond by imposing further restrictions on economic self-
reliance  and  encampment  conditions  for  refugees.  Finally,  refugee-hosting 
developing countries might oppose the diversion of aid from the needs of the native 
population to the refugees within their territory.  
 
Aid to the Country of Origin 
Alternatively, the Western asylum country could transfer aid towards the country of 
origin  in  order  to  reduce  refugee  outflow  and  facilitate  a  sustainable  voluntary 
repatriation. Pre-conditioned by the fact that countries of origin do not hinder a 
voluntary repatriation of their population after mass emigration, rapid post-conflict 
reconstruction  with  appropriate  levels  of  civil  security,  basic  social  services  and 
economic perspectives for returnees might be a prior rationale for targeting foreign 
aid towards the country of origin (UNHCR, 2006a).  
Obviously,  cross-the-border  asylum  countries  are  also  interested  in  sustainable 
return  solutions  with  voluntary  repatriation  and  reintegration  of  refugees  that 
would otherwise stay within their territory. Thus, aid to the country of origin that 
ensures  rising  income  levels  for  the  conflict-affected  population  is  also  in  the 
interest of first asylum countries, since –without considering asylum migration to 
the  Western  country-  the  total  stock  of  refugees  in  the  first  asylum  country 
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However, the consequences for the Western asylum country are less distinct. Taking 
into  account  eqs.  (19),   
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Figure 5 shows that both curves shift upwards so that the total effect on Western 
asylum  migration  becomes  unclear.  Aid  transfers  to  the  country  of  origin  are 
unambiguously beneficial for the first asylum country, but not for the Western aid 
donor.  
Figure 5 Increasing Income Level in the Country of Origin 
 
A numerical simulation of the effect of such a policy, shown in Table 1, indicates 
that the asylum pressure exerted on the Western asylum country is generally lower 
                                                      
18 See derivations in the Appendix. 23 
 
the more liberal the first asylum country in its self-reliance policy. However, the 
effect  of  income-inducing  aid           on  the  change  in  the  number  of  asylum-
seeking individuals                 is not as clear. It is possible that for rather high 
values  of  the  parameter   ,  i.e.  when  economic  self-reliance  is  widely  granted  to 
refugees in the first asylum country, aid to the conflict-affected country of origin 
could even increase the number of individuals that choose the asylum option in the 
Western country. Why? Simply stated, the better the economic conditions in the 
country of origin, the lower the value of the permanent cross-border option relative 
to  the  asylum  option  in  the  Western  country.  This  occurs  when  economic  self-
reliance in the first asylum country is generous (s is high) and therefore permanent 
cross-border migration is relatively extensive. This implies that also less persecuted 
people  with  medium  to  high  levels  of     choose,  ceteris  paribus,  this  option. 
However, for these less persecuted individuals, the risk of deportation (if they would 
choose the asylum option in the Western country instead) is associated with a lower 
disutility of living at home than to the highly persecuted individuals. Thus, aid to 
the country of origin reduces permanent migration to the first asylum country but 
increases asylum migration to the Western  country,  because the less persecuted 
individuals choose this option instead. Thus, aid to the country of origin is only 
effective for the Western country if the cross-border option is devaluated by a strict 
refugee  policy  of  the  first  asylum  country.  This  unclear  aid  impact  might  also 
contribute  to  the  fact  that  Western  donor  countries  are  rather  hesitant  in 


















                          
                
    
                
100  0.95  0.162  0.693  0 
110  0.95  0.542  0.219  0 
120  0.95  0.580  0  0.093 
130  0.95  0.530  0  0.063 
100  0.90  0.609  0.250  0 
110  0.90  0.682  0.079  0 
120  0.90  0.633  0  0.040 
130  0.90  0.558  0  0.035 
100  0.85  0.788  0.068  0 
110  0.85  0.731  0  0.024 
120  0.85  0.655  0  0.018 
130  0.85  0.573  0  0.020 
 
Self-financing Proactive Asylum Policy 
In light of these potentially unwanted effects of proactive measures on refugee 
migration, we should explore whether Western asylum countries would have any 
incentive  to  invest  in  such  proactive  measures.  Given  the  efficacy  of  aid  as  an 
instrument for increasing the respective income level of conflict-affected individuals 
living  either  permanently  or  temporarily  in  the  country  of  origin  or  in  the  first 
asylum country, aid transfers require that there must be benefits, e.g. in terms of 
decreasing asylum costs, that need to spill over to the Western (aid-giving) asylum 
country.  Thus,  this  normative  postulate  presumes  double-effectiveness:  aid  is 
effective  in  increasing  respective  income,  and  consequently,  this  is  effective  in 
reducing asylum migration flows to the Western country.  
                                                      
19  The  simulation  is  run  with  the  following  parameter  values:                          
                         . 
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Then, a self-interested Western donor country allocates a positive amount of aid 
              to  the  first  asylum  country  (  )  or  to  the  country  of  origin  (  ) 
according to the following marginality condition: 
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However, even if this necessary allocation condition holds, it is not sufficient. Aid is 
only transferred if the aid-induced reduction in asylum-related costs       is larger 
than the transferred amount of aid  .
20  
Figure 6 illustrates this relationship between the aid-induced reduction of asylum-
related costs      and the transferred amount of aid. According to this, migration-
preventive aid is cost-effective (‘self-financing’) if total costs                  have 
a global minimum with a positive amount of aid, i.e. if             . Consequently, 
if aid is migration-effective, aid for refugees might be a reasonable policy option for 
Western asylum countries. 
 
Figure 6  Self-financing Proactive Asylum Policy 
 
                                                      
20 These costs might capture all type of costs that the Western asylum country accrues for 
hosting asylum seekers (e.g. administration, maintenance, repatriation/deportation etc.).  26 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This  study  contributes  to  the  economic  analysis  of  refugee  migration.  Utility-
maximizing individuals that are in danger of their life, leave their home countries 
not primarily out of economic reasons but to avoid the disutility of persecution. 
However,  refugees  also  respond  to  economic  incentives.  Equivalent  economic 
conditions in a cross-the-border country or the expectation of asylum status in a 
Western  country  with  better  economic  perspectives  induce  long-lasting  absence 
from the country of origin. Consequently, refugee situations that are generated by 
conflict and human rights violations at home and are sustained in neighboring first 
asylum countries for a long period of time go in hand with a twofold asylum policy 
failure. First, two-sided restrictive asylum policies force refugees to stay in desperate 
encampment  situations  in  remote  areas.  And  second,  a  lack  of  proactive 
engagement of Western countries either in the country of origin or the first asylum 
country  hinders  the  implementation  of  a  durable  solution  in  terms  of  voluntary 
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Table A Model Derivations  
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